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RECENT CASES
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION TO FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT BAR
CLAIM THAT FEDERAL AGENCIES
IMPROPERLY LICENSED AND
RELEASED POLIO VACCINE
In Berkovitz By Berkovitz v. United States, -
U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988), the United States
Supreme Court held that the discretionary func-
tion exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), did not bar a claim alleging that the Divi-
sion of Biologic Standards ("DBS"), then a part
of the National Institutes of Health, licensed the
production of an oral polio vaccine without first
receiving required test data. The Court also held
that the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA did not bar a claim that employees of the
Food and Drug Administration's Bureau of Bio-
logics ("Bureau") knowingly approved the re-
lease of a specific lot of vaccine which failed to
conform to safety standards.
Background
In May, 1979, Kevan Berkovitz, then a 2-
month-old infant, ingested a dose of Orimune,
an oral polio vaccine manufactured by Lederle
Laboratories ("Lederle"). Berkovitz subse-
quently contracted a severe case of polio which
left him almost completely paralyzed and un-
able to breathe without a respirator. Berkovitz,
joined by his parents as guardians, filed suit in
federal district court alleging that the vaccine
had caused his injuries and that the United
States was liable under the FTCA. The complaint
stated that the DBS wrongfully licensed Lederle
to produce Orimune and that the Bureau wrong-
fully approved release of the specific lot of
Orimune containing Berkovitz's dose.
District Court
In the district court, the Government moved
to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The FTCA contains a provision
which immunizes employees of federal agen-
cies from suits based upon their exercise or fail-
ure to exercise a discretionary function or duty.
In its motion to dismiss, the Government argued
that its actions were barred from suit because
they fell within this discretionary function excep-
tion. The district court denied this motion, find-
ing that neither the licensing nor the release of a
specific lot of the vaccine fell within the discre-
tionary function exception. Upon the Govern-
ment's request, the district court granted the
Government's motion for an immediate appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
Court of Appeals
A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision. The court rejected the
Government's argument that all regulatory ac-
tivities of federal agencies are discretionary, but
held that licensing and releasing polio vaccines
were discretionary actions. Thus, the court held
that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Berkovitz's claims because these
claims were barred by the discretionary function
exception. The dissent contended that the licens-
ing and releasing of polio vaccines were activi-
ties controlled by regulatory and statutory direc-
tives which left no room for any exercise of
discretion on the part of government officials.
United States Supreme Court: The Discretionary
Function Exception
Because Berkovitz's claims came before the
Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court consi-
dered only whether Berkovitz's claims could
survive a motion to dismiss, not whether his
claims had been proven. Writing for a unanim-
ous Court, justice Marshall began his analysis by
considering the scope of the discretionary func-
tion exception as it relates to governmental
activities. Specifically, the Court addressed
whether the discretionary function exception
would protect governmental actions involving
the licensing of an oral polio vaccine and the
release to the public of a specific lot of the
vaccine.
The Court stated that Congress' purpose in
enacting the discretionary function exception
was to prevent outside interference with the
judgments of governmental agencies. The dis-
cretionary function exception "marks the
boundary between Congress' willingness to im-
pose tort liability upon the United States and its
desire to protect certain governmental activities
from exposure to suit by private individuals."
108 S.Ct. at 1958 (quoting United States v. Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984)). In considering
the applicability of the discretionary function
exception, the Court observed that the excep-
tion precludes liability only in cases involving
the permissible exercise of policy judgment. In
cases where a statute, regulation, or policy spe-
cifically prescribe a course of action, no exercise
of judgment is needed, so the discretionary
function exception cannot be invoked in order
to avoid liability. The Court thus rejected the
Government's argument that any and all regula-
tory acts of federal agencies are exempt from
liability.
Unclear Whether DBS' Licensing of Vaccine
Improper
In accordance with the Public Health and Wel-
fare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
a manufacturer must be licensed by the DBS in
order to market an oral polio vaccine. To be-
come eligible for a license, a manufacturer must
first submit to the DBS samples of the vaccine
made during the various stages of the manufac-
turing process, as well as a sample of the finished
product. The DBS is required by various statu-
tory and regulatory provisions to inspect the
submitted samples to ensure that they comply
with safety standards. In 1963, the DBS licensed
Lederle to produce Orimune.
Berkovitz made two allegations regarding the
DBS's licensing of Lederle. First, Berkovitz al-
leged that the DBS issued the license before
receiving the required samples of the vaccine.
The Court found that the DBS exercises no dis-
cretion in issuing product licenses because this
activity is directed by statute and regulation.
Therefore, Berkovitz's claim based on an allega-
tion of improper licensing was not barred by the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA.
Second, Berkovitz alleged that the license was
issued even though the vaccine did not meet the
required safety standards. Because the parties
failed to address this allegation in detail, the
Court determined that it could be construed in
any one of three ways. If Berkovitz's allegation
meant either that the DBS licensed the vaccine
without determining whether the vaccine com-
plied with regulatory standards or that the DBS
licensed the vaccine after establishing that the
vaccine failed to meet the standards, the discre-
tionary function exception would not bar the
claim. No discretion is involved in either of these
circumstances because the agency may not
deviate from mandated procedure.
If Berkovitz's allegation meant that the DBS
licensed the vaccine as the result of an incorrect
finding that the vaccine met the required safety
standards, the Court held that it was then
unclear whether the discretionary function ex-
ception barred the claim. The decision turned
on whether government officials can exercise
policy judgment in determining compliance
with the safety standards. Because the Court did
not have enough information to make this
determination, the matter was remanded to the
district court for decision.
Bureau's Release of Specific Lot of Polio Vaccine
May Be Discretionary
Berkovitz alleged that the Bureau had adopted
a policy of testing each and every vaccine lot for
compliance with safety standards. If a lot failed
to comply with these standards, the Bureau
would prohibit its distribution to the public.
Berkovitz alleged that this policy was non-dis-
cretionary, and that even though the policy left
no room for officials to implement independent
policy judgment, employees of the Bureau
knowingly released a lot which failed to comply
with safety standards. Regulations of the federal
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") gener-
ally allow the Bureau to establish the approp-
riate method for releasing lots of any licensed
product. The regulations provide that the Bureau
is authorized to examine any vaccine lot and to
prohibit its distribution if it fails to comply with
safety, purity, or potency standards. 21 CFR §
610.2(a) (1988). A manufacturer may not distrib-
ute a particular lot until it is released by the
Bureau.
The Court distinguished this regulatory
scheme from that governing the issuance of
licenses. Because the FDA regulations govern-
ing release of vaccine lots do not require the
Bureau to take action in all cases, the Court
found them to be discretionary. Accordingly, the
discretionary function exception would bar suits
alleging that the Bureau had inappropriately
formulated methods of regulating the release of
vaccine lots. With regard to the liability of indi-
vidual governmental officials, the Court held
that if the regulatory scheme left room for the
exercise of independent policy judgment con-
cerning the release of vaccine lots, then the dis-
cretionary function exception would protect
these individuals from liability. The discretionary
function exception would not bar a claim that an
act was negligent or wrongful if the official's act
did not involve the exercise of policy judgment.
The Court held that Berkovitz's claim regard-
ing the Bureau's release of the vaccine lot in
question survived the Government's motion to
dismiss because this claim was directed at a
governmental action that allegedly left no room
for individual officials to exercise independent
judgment. In remanding the case for further
proceedings, the Court stated that until a de-
termination is made as to whether the release of
vaccine lots involves the exercise of policy
judgment, Berkovitz should be allowed to main-
tain his claim regarding the release of a specific
lot of the vaccine.
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